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2. How SHOULD AMERICA ADDRESS THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN
TERRORISTS?
I started sketching my answer to this question after the
National Security Retreat in September but before Thanksgiving,
and I was going to respond generally that the United States seemed
to have experienced less virulent radicalization than had some
European countries. I was going to point out that the vast majority
of American citizens or residents accused of post-9/11 terrorism
had been accused of providing material support, whether to al
Qaeda, or simply in support of terrorist plots.
The most serious plots-in the sense of potential or actual
carnage to Americans-to date have been those involving
Najibullah Zazi (the New York subway bomber) , Faisal Shahzad
t Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. J.D., 1995, University of
California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
1. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005) (highlighting the problem of
individuals in the United States who are sworn supporters of al Qaeda but have
not committed a crime).
2. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 425 (2007) (discussing the
increased use of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A).
3. Attorney-General Holder described Zazi's plot as "one of the most serious
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(the Times Square bomber), and Nidal Malik Hasan (the Fort
Hood shooter). Zazi, an Afghan citizen, did not arrive in the
United States until he was a teenager. Shahzad, who was born in
Pakistan, did not come to the United States until he was 18; he later
acquired U.S. citizenship through marriage to an American
woman. By contrast, the London bombings were carried out by
three native born British citizens (Mohammad Sidique Khan,
Shehzad Tanweer, and Hasib Hussain) and one naturalized citizen
who came to the United Kingdom as a child (Germaine Lindsay).
Similarly, the 2006 transatlantic airline bombing plot-which
targeted London-to-U.S. flights for in-flight explosive attacks-was
planned by about twenty or so Britons, almost all of whom were
native born. I was going to highlight this distinction and suggest
that, while there were no doubt steps that the United States could
take to further reduce the risk of radicalization, our more lenient
naturalization laws and our greater tolerance for religion and
religious diversity were probably helping to socialize native-born or
childhood immigrant Muslims.
However, the post-Thanksgiving arrests of Mohamed Osman
Mohamud in Portland, Oregon, and Antonio Martinez in
Baltimore, Maryland, for attempted use of weapons of mass
destruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a cast some doubt on
that conclusion. To be sure, we should be careful about drawing
definitive conclusions from only two examples. Furthermore, I
don't mean to suggest that the United States is likely to face a wave
of domestic terrorism attacks from homegrown terrorists or sleeper
cells, only that the difference in threats that we face versus what the
western Europeans face may be a matter of degree, not kind. Still,
both Mohamud and Martinez-along with Oklahoma City bomber
Timothy McVeigh and Unabomber Ted Kaczynski-refute the
notion that socialization as an American is a vaccination from
susceptibility to violent terrorism.
One can draw sobering lessons from the horrific incidents
involving Major Hasan, as well as Jared Loughner, whose January
2011 shooting spree in a Tucson supermarket killed a federal judge
terrorist threats to our nation since September 11th, 2001 . . . ." See Press Release,
Dep't of justice, Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives
Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing
Material Support to al Qaeda, (Feb. 22, 2010), available at
http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel0/nyfo022210.htm.
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and five other civilians and wounded thirteen, including
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, who was shot in the head. In
both instances, there were warning signs about the potential
dangerousness of the individuals,4 but the state and federal
governments took essentially no steps to protect the local
community. In part, that's because the Constitution generally does
not permit the government to lock people up merely due to their
perceived dangerousness.
Yet doing nothing in those incidents had tragic consequences.
Similarly, while Mohamed Mohamud apparently never would have
been able to build a bomb on his own without the help of the
undercover FBI agents, he could very easily have bought a bunch of
guns and opened fire on the Pioneer Square crowd in downtown
Portland. The death toll would not have been nearly as bad as that
inflicted by a car bomb, but it still could have been dozens of dead
or wounded Oregonians-just imagine the Fort Hood shootings,
but in a much more densely packed crowd.
A sting operation has the virtue of providing a quick
opportunity for the target to demonstrate that he or she is not a
terrorist, by declining to proceed with plans for any violent actions.
For example, the FBI affidavit in the Mohamud case indicates that,
at the first meeting between Mohamud and the undercover
operatives, the agents told Mohamud that he could help "the
cause" in a number of ways, ranging from being a good Muslim by
praying five times a day to completing his college degree to "going
operational" to becoming a martyr. Assuming that the affidavit
accurately describes the encounter and that the government agents
did not entrap him, Mohamud-were he not inclined toward
violence-could have opted for some choice other than "going
4. SeeJOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN & SUSAN M. COLLINS, U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Special Report, A Ticking Time
Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort
Hood Attack, Feb. 3, 2011, at 27 ("[Major Hasan's] public displays of radicalization
toward violent Islamist extremism during his medical residency and post-residency
fellowship were clear."); Robert Anglen, fared Lee Loughner, suspect in Gabrielle
Giffords shooting, had college run-ins, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Jan. 9, 2011, at A8 (noting that
Loughner was suspended from Pima Community College for mental health
reasons and that he could not return to the school until he could show that he was
not a danger to himself or others).
5. See Arrest Warrant at 13, 1 35, United States v. Mohamud, (Or. D. Ct.
Nov. 26, 2010), available at http://media.oregonlive.com/portland-impact
/other/USAFFIDAVIT.pdf.
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operational" (or becoming a martyr).
Yet, the use of the sting operation in this case has seemingly
polarized the Portland community, with a good portion of it
outraged at federal officials. A good deal of that outrage stems
from the perception that the FBI entrapped Mohamud by
supplying him with the money for the bomb parts and constructing
the bomb with the parts he acquired.r But some of the outrage
seems to have been driven by disagreement with the sting tactic
itself. This should be of not inconsiderable concern to government
officials, since the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office fired an effective
opening salvo in the public relations battle by making the arrest
warrant and accompanying affidavit available to the press right
after arresting Mohamud. Since then, Attorney General Eric
Holder made numerous statements defending the government's
handling of the case-indeed, so many, and with such vigor, that
Mohamud's lawyers eventually filed a motion for a gag order
directed against Holder.
In my view, undercover sting operations of the sort carried out
against Mohamud are a necessary law enforcement tool against the
threat of domestic terrorism. But identifying those persons who
warrant being targeted in a sting operation will often require tips
and support from the local community. Mohamud, after all, came
to the FBI's attention in the first place because his father alerted
the government to his son's apparent radicalization. To the extent
that a significant portion of the community-Portland, in this
case-questions the use of an undercover sting operation, it
suggests that one of the primary challenges that the government
faces in addressing the threat of domestic terrorism is successfully
persuading the public more effectively about the need for such
counterterrorism actions. If the public perceives the use of sting
operations as oppressive, discriminatory, or unreasonably intrusive,
6. Published letters to the editor in the Oregonian in the days after
Mohamud's arrest split about evenly between those who applauded the FBI and
those who mocked it for foiling its own plot. A detailed discussion of the
entrapment issues is beyond the scope of this short essay. A brief primer on
entrapment as it applies to this case can be found in Bryan Denson, Portland Bomb
Plot Case Likely to Serve as Primer on Entrapment, FBI Sting Issues, THE OREGONIAN,
Dec. 4, 2010, at Al.
7. See Motion for Order Directing the Government to Cease and Desist from
Inappropriate Pretrial Comment, United States v. Mohamud, No. CR 10-475-KI,
Dec. 20, 2010 (copy on file with author).
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then the government may be scoring a Pyhrric victory: short-term
gain in the form of immediate prosecutions of potential terrorists,
but long-term loss as local community distrust results in drying up
of tips and support. I don't pretend to have any easy answers as to
how to manage this balancing act, but to the extent domestic
terrorism is perceived as a more likely source of mass violence than
international terrorism, it is something that the government should
be figuring out.
5. HAS OBAMA IMPROVED BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES?
The first thing to acknowledge is that when it comes to the
most criticized counterterrorism policies, President Bush improved
on his own between, roughly speaking, his first and second terms in
the White House.8 By his second term, waterboarding and coercive
interrogations were no longer in use, the only detainees being
transferred to Guantanamo were essentially the high-level captives
who had been held in secret prisons, and administrative hearings
continued to repatriate Guantanamo detainees to their home
countries. One might characterize the efforts as grudging, some
having been forced by the Supreme Court in a series of cases
starting with Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld," or one might
attribute the change to the rising influence of some government
lawyers, like James Comey and Jack Goldsmith," or both. If you
compare President Obama's national security policies to President
Bush's, the contrast will appear stark if you're looking at first-term
Bush policies, but mild if you're looking at second-term Bush
policies.
That's not to say that there haven't been any changes. The
Obama administration tried to prosecute accused 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) in federal court rather than a
military commission, but that effort has stalled and appears fruitless
at this point. President Obama issued an executive order blocking
the use of torture or coercion in interrogations. At the same time,
8. See, e.g., Peter Bozzo & Henry Shull, Obama's Blank Check, HARV. POLITICAL
REv., Dec. 5, 2010, at 12, available at http://hpronline.org/americas-foreign-
policy/obama%E2%80%99s-blank-check/.
9. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
10. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
11. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007).
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there are still close to 200 detainees at Guantanamo, and a
presidential task force has recommended indefinite detention for
about fifty of those detainees. Furthermore, the White House has
dramatically stepped up its use of unmanned aerial vehicles to
target al Qaeda members and militants for targeted killing.
Whether one thinks that President Obama has improved
President Bush's national security policies, therefore, should be
largely (but not totally) a reflection of whether one approved of the
latter's policies in the first place. Not surprisingly, then, some Bush
administration critics, like Glenn Greenwald, have criticized
President Obama quite harshly." On the other hand, Georgetown
law professor David Cole, also a Bush critic, has defended the
President, arguing that the President's record has been mixed but
,13
nevertheless a marked improvement over his predecessor's.
In my view, the major improvement that President Obama has
made has been to gain greater acceptance of the underlying
framework for current U.S. counterterrorism actions-which is to
say, use of military force as well as criminal prosecutions. Although
there remains some vocal opposition to the targeted-killing
program and to the continuing indefinite detention of suspected al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters at Guantanamo, the intensity of such
opposition has weakened. By banning the most egregious aspects
of his predecessor's policies, President Obama took much of the
wind from the sails of many critics. Of course, one might argue
that it was easier for the President to take such steps because by the
time he took office in January 2009, KSM had been in U.S. custody
for almost six years-long enough that it was unlikely he would
have any timely information at that point. Waterboarding him to
extract any undisclosed information would be largely punitive in
nature, without any instrumental gain. To be sure, I'm not arguing
that exigent circumstances or perceived necessity can legally justify
(or excuse) waterboarding or other coercion or torture. All I am
saying is that President Obama didn't have to do the right thing
(ban waterboarding) in the face of pressure for extraction of
immediate information. Perhaps President Obama would have
12. Glenn Greenwald, The Death of Dawn fohnsen's Nomination, SALON (Apr. 9,
2010), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn greenwald/2010/04/09
/johnsen.
13. David Cole, Breaking Away: Obama's War on Terror is not "Bush Lite," THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2010, at 17.
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fallen prey to the same desire for expediency that the Bush
administration did. Nevertheless, even if President Obama
benefitted from the circumstances (as well perhaps from simply not
being George W. Bush), it is under his watch that national and
international attitudes toward our armed conflict against al Qaeda
have improved.
6. SHOULD KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED EVER BE BROUGHT TO
TRIAL?
It appears that the Obama administration has come to the
conclusion that the answer is "no."" This conclusion followed
about a year of political impotency where the president found
himself thwarted and opposed by Republicans in Congress as well
as New York Democratic politicians.
If we put aside the politics of trying KSM in a civilian court, we
can answer whether he should be tried by asking, what do we hope
to achieve through criminal prosecution? One answer might be
that a criminal trial would demonstrate KSM's guilt and culpability
conclusively to the world-particularly, the Arab Middle East.
Another answer might be conviction in a trial would allow the
imposition of punishment, which is traditionally based on notions
of retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
On balance, I am not persuaded that these are good enough
reasons to push for criminal prosecution. The argument for trying
KSM in a federal court rather than a military commission is that the
former offers greater procedural protections, whereas the latter
might be dismissed as kangaroo courts,' 5 notwithstanding the 2009
revisions and amendments that President Obama signed into law.
A conviction of KSM in a military commission might be dismissed
as a foreordained result. Conviction in a federal court, on the
14. See Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Opposition to U.S. Tial Likely to Keep
Mastermind of 9/11 Attacks in Detention, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/12
/AR2010111207508.html ("Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-proclaimed
mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, will probably remain in military
detention without trial for the foreseeable future, according to Obama
administration officials.").
15. See, e.g., David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the
21st Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REv. 2005 (2003) (discussing the history
and modern legal developments related to military commissions).
50952011]
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other hand, would probably be seen by our European allies as more
legitimate than a conviction in a military tribunal. As former
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has noted, one of the primary
reasons that the Bush administration prosecuted shoe bomber
Richard Reid in federal court instead of a military tribunal was that
Great Britain would have balked at having its citizen tried in the
latter forum. 6
However, it is far from clear that other parts of the world, such
as the Middle East, would similarly view a federal court conviction
as legitimate. Consider one 2008 survey of world opinions that
asked, "Who do you think was behind the 9/11 attacks?," with
possible responses of "al Qaeda," "US govt," "Israel," "other," and
"don't know." For all countries, the averages were al Qaeda (46
percent), U.S. Government (15 percent), Israel (7 percent), other
(7 percent), and don't know (25 percent) . In itself, it is stunning
that more than half of those surveyed did not believe that al Qaeda
was behind the 9/11 attacks. Even more disturbing is the fact that
in Turkey, almost as many people believe that the U.S. Government
(36 percent) was responsible as believe that al Qaeda was (39
percent); or that in Egypt, only 16 percent believe al Qaeda was
responsible, but 43 percent believe that Israel was; or that in
Jordan, only 11 percent believe al Qaeda was responsible, but 17
percent believe the U.S. Government was responsible, and 31
percent believe Israel was responsible. This is a survey that was
conducted in the summer of 2008, long after the exhaustive 9/11
Commission published its report cataloguing the evidence against
al Qaeda, and after numerous videos and statements in which
Osama bin Laden admitted or claimed credit for the 9/11 attacks.
16. Alberto R. Gonzales, Waging War Within the Constitution, 42 TEX. TEcH L.
REV. 843, 867 (2010) ("The British Attorney General expressed concerns to me
directly and other Administration lawyers about prosecuting British citizens in U.S.
military commissions.").
17. See World Public Opinion, International Poll: No Consensus On Who Was
Behind 9/11 (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles
/international-securitybt/535.php?nid=&id=&pnt=535.
18. See Transcript of Usama bin Laden Video Tape, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE
(Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.defense.gov/news/Dec2001/d20011213ubl.pdf; Full
text: bin Laden's "letter to America, " THE GUARDIAN (UK) (Nov. 24, 2002),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver; Full transcript of bin
Ladin's speech, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 1, 2004), http://english.aljazeera.net
/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html; Transcript of the Alleged Bin Laden
Tape, ABC NEWS (May 23, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/International
/Terrorism/story?id=1995630&page=1.
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Arguably, a trial that resulted in a conviction would amass proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, but wouldn't change opinions in those
parts of the world where more people believe that the United
States or Israel were behind the 9/11 attacks.19
As for punishment, at the risk of being glib, I do not think that
we are interested in attempting to rehabilitate KSM. And as long as
one accepts the legality of military detention, we can incapacitate
KSM by holding him indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay (or whatever
other long-term detention facility we shift remaining detainees to if
Camp Delta were to be closed). And if we are interested in
inflicting punishment-specifically, the death penalty-that could
be achieved in a military commission as easily as in federal court.
Weighed against the seemingly minimal benefits of
prosecuting KSM in federal court are the potential downsides of
doing so. Consider the recently concluded trial of Ahmed
Ghailani, who was indicted for his role in the 1998 bombings of
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The district court correctly
excluded key government witness on the grounds that the
government had learned of his identity only through coercive
interrogation of Ghailani; that is, the witness was derivative
evidence to be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. Without
that witness, the government's case seemingly took a severe body
blow, as the jury convicted Ghailani of only one count, conspiracy,
and acquitted him of 273 counts of murder and eleven other
charges. True, the one count of conviction resulted in a life
sentence, but if that one conviction is reversed on appeal, then
Ghailani could be retried only on the one count-and perhaps not
even that, if the reason for reversal were for insufficiency of the
evidence, or if the acquittals were to collaterally estop the
government from relitigating key facts underlying the conspiracy
21charge.
Prosecuting KSM involves similar evidentiary challenges.
Because he was waterboarded over 100 times, his initial
confessions-made during his captivity in a secret CIA prison-
19. See Michael Slackman, 9/11 Rumors That Harden Into Conventional Wisdom,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2008, at A16 (discussing anecdotal evidence of how opinions in
Egypt have hardened on the issue of who carried out the 9/11 attacks).
20. United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (order
granting defendant's motion to exclude the prosecution's witness).
21. The seminal case on collateral estoppel's effects of acquittals on
subsequent trials is Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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would be clearly inadmissible. His subsequent confession, which
took place during his detention at Guantanamo Bay and was not
induced by coercion or torture, might still be inadmissible. The
problem is that the government might well believe that it can get
the second confession into evidence, but it won't know that for
certain until after beginning proceedings in federal court. No
doubt the prosecutors in the Ghailani case felt they could get their
key witness to the court, too, and they were unhappily surprised.
And what if KSM were acquitted in federal court? Presumably,
we would simply continue to detain him indefinitely as an enemy
combatant, but if the whole point of the exercise was to earn
legitimacy in the eyes of the world, that would be a giant step
backwards. I thinkJack Goldsmith and Ben Wittes have it right: the
government should abandon plans to try KSM in federal court or a
military commission, and just detain him.
22. Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), is not directly controlling but it
could be read to bar the subsequent confession. In Siebert, a police detective
conducted a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings and obtained a
confession from the defendant. Id. The detective then read the Miranda warnings
and re-interrogated the defendant to elicit the same confession. Id. The Court
held that the second confession had to be suppressed. Id. at 617. True, Siebert did
emphasize the closeness in time of the two confessions, and so the fact that
months, if not years, passed between KSM's confessions might distinguish Siebert.
On the other hand, Siebert noted the following relevant factors in determining
whether the taint of the first invalid confession had been dissipated: "[T]he
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of
interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and
setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the
degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as
continuous with the first." Id. at 615.
23. Benjamin Wittes & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Best Trial Option for KSM:
Nothing, WASH. PosT, Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031702844.html (noting the "great
energy [expended] on a battle over the proper forum for an unnecessary trial"
and arguing that leaving KSM in indefinite detention is a better solution).
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